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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
recognized by the legislature as a valuable property right, separate
and distinct from the oil and gas. It is therefore arguable that
such right should be expressly bargained for, and not be acquired
by implication. Thus, in both the principal case and in the hypo-
thetical case, the right to use the containing space for the storage
of gas has independent significance. It is not an implied right, and
if the mineral owner expects more in connection with his grant, he
ought to stipulate for it.
C. J. C.
PARENT AND CHILD-RIGHT OF CHILD TO RECOVER IN TORT
AGAINST PAPENT.-P, a minor aged seven, sought damages for in-
juries caused by the alleged negligence of D, a partnership. P's
father was a member of the partnership. Held, on appeal, that a
parent in his business or vocational capacity is not immune from a
personal tort action by his unemancipated minor child. Signs v.
Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
The ancient common law did not, it appears, expressly deny
to a child a right of action against his parent for personal injury
negligently inflicted. Villaret v. Villaret, 83 App. D.C. 311, 169
F.2d 677 (1948); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E.
551 (1928). Common law conceptions of unity of the persons
resulted in the rule that tort actions could not be maintained
between husband and wife. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 632 (1933);
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 897 (1941). Evidently, due to the close
resemblance of the relationships, many courts in the United States
have erroneously upheld parental immunity as a common law
doctrine. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905);
Mataresee v. Mataresee, 47 R.I. 131, 131 At. 198 (1925).
In this country prior to 1891, only three cases dealing with the
tort liability of parents and persons in loco parentis had appeared.
Inclination toward liability was expressed in all three. Gould v.
Christianson, 10 Fed. Cas. 857, No. 5,636 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1836);
Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885); Lander v.
Seaver, 32 Utah 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859).
Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), is the leading
case in the United States denying recovery to the child in an action
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against his parent for personal injury. This case has been generally
followed by the American courts, including two intermediate appel-
late courts in Ohio. Canen v. Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E.
277 (1931); Krohngold v. Krohngold, 181 N.E. 910 (Ohio App.
1932). Since the Mississippi case cites no authority and offers very
little discussion, its far-reaching effect among the courts appears
remarkable.
In upholding parental immunity, the chief reason offered is
that domestic tranquillity and parental discipline and control
would be disturbed by the action. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn.
77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E.
12 (1923). Supporting elements offered by advocates of the rule
are that a contrary rule would prevent the possibility that the
family finances might be depleted at the expense of the other
children, or that the door might be opened for fraudulent claims.
Others state that such actions would be against public policy.
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAv. 'L. REv.
1030 (1930).
In comparatively recent years, dissenting voices have been
raised in criticism of adherence to an absolute rule which in some
instances has resulted in a denial of justice. There has been a
growing judicial inclination to depart very materially from the
broad doctrine that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain a
tort action against his parent. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150
Atl. 905 (1930); Cowgell v. Boock, 189 Ore. 218, 218 P.2d 445
(1950); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
The modern view is exemplified by the trend of the West
Virginia cases. In 1931, the initial case involving parental im-
munity in a tort action was decided by the supreme court. In
this case, Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E.2d 750, 37 W.
VA. L.Q. 315 (1931), involving an action by an unemancipated
daughter against her father for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident, the court denied the daughter the right to recover. In
granting parental immunity, the court based its decision on the
ground that society has an interest in preserving harmony in do-
mestic matters, and in not permitting families to be torn asunder
by suits for damages by insolent and ungrateful children, for real
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or fancied grievances. However, in the much cited case of Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E.2d 538 (1932), the court deviated
from the majority view of the nonliability of a parent for a per-
sonal injury sustained by an unemancipated minor or child. In
this case the father was protected by an indemnity insurance policy
he and his employer carried. In delivering its opinion, the court
declared that the rule of parental immunity for an injury to a
child will not be extended where the reason for the rule fails. The
Securo case was not overruled but rather distinguished from the
Lusk case. The court rationalized that recovery in actions of this
nature should assure domestic harmony rather than disrupt it.
The opinion in the Lusk case reflects the view on parental immun-
ity in West Virginia, that is, recognition of the general rule of
parental immunity subject to deviations where the reason for the
rule fails.
Authority for another exception to the general rule has been
created by the decision of the principal case. Practically all the
previous exceptions have been limited to instances where there
was either a willful tort by the parent, or the parent was finan-
cially protected by insurance (or workmen's compensation). Dun-
lap v. Dunlap, supra; Cowgell v. Cowgell, supra; Worrell v. Wor-
rell, supra. The court in the principal case declared that the prob-
lem should be solved irrespective of the presence of indemnity
insurance.
Perhaps the reason underlying the court's ruling was that the
complete burden of liability would not necessarily fall upon the
parent's shoulders, since he was a member of a partnership. How-
ever, the opinion shows no indication that the partnership element
was the ground for decision. If the court had relied on this fact,
its decision might be better justified. The court has not discarded
the parental immunity rule, but has refused to follow the rule
where a parent is engaged in his business or vocational capacity
when the tort is committed. However, the language used by the
court to support its holding indicates that the only reason it did
not reject the rule was because it was not necessary to go so far in
this case. Evidently, the Ohio court had little regard for the
sound policy of the majority which attempts to preserve the tran-
quillity of the home. It is doubtful that the courts of other juris-
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dictions which have approved some deviation from the absolute




PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW. By Manfred S. Guttmacher and
Henry Weihofen. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
1952. Pp. 461. $7.50.
From the lawyer's viewpoint, here is a book which may be
used in numerous ways.
Before dealing specifically with that evaluation, the uniqueness
of the book ought to be noted. This appears to be the first joint
effort of a psychiatrist 'and a lawyer to interpret legal psychiatry,
resulting in a presentation of the subject more understandable to
either psychiatrists or lawyers - and the public - than a treatment
by either alone would have produced. The material written by
each seems easily identifiable, but one cannot fail to notice the
apparent influence of the one writer upon the other in his pre-
sentation. The psychiatrist's special vocabulary is rarely found
in this book, and the legal rules and principles are presented in
a manner intelligible by the jury - presumably intended to be
the public.
The book should have a strong appeal to those lawyers who
are- interested in improving the administration of justice. Here
is the only general book on legal psychiatry which has appeared
in this country during the past quartet century during which per-
iod psychiatry has been making its greatest progress in both prac-
tice and influence. Have these developments been reflected by
appropriate changes in the law? A general treatment of this ques-
tion is found in the book, but the West Virginia lawyer will be
more interested in noting how few steps have been taken in this
jurisdiction, as compared with procedures elsewhere, to recognize
in our law established findings of psychiatry. Often such changes
have not been forthcoming because of misunderstanding and mis-
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